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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
under U.C.A. §78-2a-3 (2) (j) , being a case transferred to the Court
of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court .
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the Order of the First District Court
dismissing

the Stockings' Complaint

41(b), U.R.C.P.
discretion.

with prejudice under Rule

The Stockings believe the trial court abused its

The trial court had earlier denied two Motions for

Summary Disposition made by the Defendants.

A related case on

appeal before the Utah Supreme Court, Barber vs. Emporium, Supreme
Court No. 880410, has been briefed.

The relief requested in that

case for Von Stocking, in part III, is similar to the relief
requested for Mr. and Mrs. Stocking in this suit.

The Stockings

claim that the Defendants Barbers and Daines wrongfully interfered
with a business arrangement they had with First Federal; that First
Federal wrongfully breached an agreement to allow the Stockings to
cure a Trust Deed Note default; and that Defendants Barbers and
Daines failed to credit a judgment held against Von Stocking with
the value of the property, taken in a Trust Deed Sale, in excess
of the amount of the trust deed note owed to First Federal.

v

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I.
Did the trial court do ju; tice to the Stockings in dismissing
the case under Rule 41(b)?

II •
Was the motion for a new trial proper after Summary Judgment
was granted?

III.
Were Stockings denied due process by the trial court's failure
to hold the required hearing?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND RULES
The following are determinative Constitutional provisions,
statutes, and rules that support the relief Appellants seek:
1.

U.S. Constitution Amendment V:
No person shall be. • .deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of
law. . .

2.

U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV, Section i:
. . .No state shall make or enforce any law
which
shall
abridge
the privileges or
immunities of citiz€>ns of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

3.

Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.

4.

Utah Constitution Article I, Section 11:
All Courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be ministered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this state,
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party.

5.

Rule 4-501(9), Code of Judicial Administration:
In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issues thereon on
the merits with prejudice, the party resisting
the motion may request a hearing and such
request shall be granted.

VII

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Stockings seek return of property and/or damages arising
from the Defendants' conduct at a Trust Deed foreclosure in 1983.
The Stockings filed suit November 3, 1983, against First Federal
Savings and Loan Association, certain of its officers, the Trust
Deed

Trustee, the Barbers, and

their attorney,

Mr. and Mrs.

Stocking, as Trustors, had been in default on a Trust Deed note.
They believed
default.
First

them to cure the

The day before the Trust Deed sale, the Barbers bought

Federal

proceeded

they had an agreement allowing

Savings and

themselves

with

Loan's beneficiary
the Trust

Deed

rights, and

sale.

then

The Barbers'

interest

in the property

was wholly motivated

attained

judgment against

Von Stocking, but not Mrs. Stocking,

arising from Von Stocking's involvement
Partnership

by a previously

in the Emporium Limited

(Record Case No. 880410 pp 14-17).

The Stocking's

Trust Deed to First Federal preceded the Barber's judgment against
Mr. Stocking by several years.
Four causes of action were stated
November 28, 1983 (Record pp. 16-35).

in the Amended Complaint

The Stockings alleged:

(1)

that the Barbers caused First Federal to breach an agreement to
allow the Stockings to cure the default in the Trust Deed on their
residence; (2)

that just before the sale, both First Federal and

the Barbers fraudulently misrepresented
Stockings; (3)

their intentions to the

that the Barbers wrongfully interfered with the

Stockings' contractual relations with First Federal; and, (4) that

1

the Barbers wrongfully interfered with the Stockings advantageous
economic relationship with First Federal.
First Federal Savings and Loan and Barbers are basically two
groups of Defendants, each of which

is separately

represented.

Both groups of Defendants unsuccessfully filed separate Motions for
Summary Judgment.

By Memorandum Decision entered March 19, 1984,

and an Order entered April 3, 1984, (Record, 129-30; 135-6), the
trial court found that there w€>re genuine issues of fact regarding
whether an accord was reached about curing the default.

The Court

said that other issues "must be tried to make these determinations'1
concerning First Federal (Record, 130).
The Barber group did not move for partial Summary Judgment
until

September

8,

1987.

By

its Memorandum

Decision

entered

October 7, 1987, and Order filed October 26, 1987, (Record 215-17),
the trial court also denied this motion.
were

questions

of

fact

as

to

The court found there

whether

the

attorney, N. George Dairies, interfered

with

Barbers

and

their

the rights of

the

Stockings by communicating with First Federal to interfere with
Stockings* rights.

The court's words included:

"Where the facts

are contested. Summary Judgment is not appropriate and the Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied"
Plaintiff's
Complaint

was

discovery

filed

and

proceeded
after

(Record, 215).

intermittently

Summary

Judgment

after
was

the

denied.

Responses to the Stockings' last requests were filed January 6,
1988 (Record 238-40) . In January 1986 and February 1987, the Court
had brought its own Order to Show Cause inquiries as to whether the
2

case should be dismissed

(Record 157; 160).

In both instances,

Plaintiffs said they had additional discovery to do and each Order
to Show Cause was dismissed

(158; 170).

dismissed

(Record

February

2,

1987

Objection to the Orders to Show Cause

After the second

170), Plaintiffs

was

filed

an

(February 6, 1987; Record

170), in which they anticipated requesting a trial date within the
year

(Record 161).

until January 6,

Discovery was proceeding for eleven months,

1988.

Thereafter, none of the parties filed

anything on this case until First Federal moved for dismissal with
prejudice under Rule 41(b) November 28, 1988 (Record 240). Their
sole argument was that the Complaint had not been prosecuted fast
enough.

The Barbers and

their attorney

joined

in the motion

December 2, 1988 (Record 255). Nothing had happened in this case
between January 6, 1988, and November 28, 1988, but Stockings and
Barbers had been in litigation in two other cases in Cache County
with the Barbers, case nos. 17630 and 25616.
involved appeals.

Both of these cases

The first of these was Barber vs. Emporium,

Cache County Uo. 17630, Court of Appeals No. 870128-CA. The second
is Barber vs. Emporium, Cache County No. 25616, Supreme Court No.
880410.

The latter case attempted to renew the judgment against

the Emporium.

Its appeal is pending before the Supreme Court.

December 6, 1988, Stockings gave notice of their objections
to the dismissal.

On December 9, 1988, they requested a hearing

on the matter, and filed a Notice of Readiness for Trial (Record,
257-64).

At the same time, Stockings also paid the $50 jury fee

(Record, 280) , and requested that the matter be tried before a jury
3

(Record, 278). December 21, 1988, the Court sent a Notice of Trial
Setting, for three days of jury trial, to all counsel (Record, 26869) . January 3, 1989, the Barbers and their attorney filed a Reply
Memorandum, setting forth their only written comments on dismissal
as a Reply to the Plaintiff's objection, but failed to send a copy
of this Reply to the Plaintiffs (Record, 270-72).
not aware

it had been filed.

The Court

Plaintiffs were

issued

its Memorandum

Decision January 19, 1989, granting Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss
with Prejudice (Record, 273). The Court did not allow Plaintiffs
their requested hearing under Rule of Practice 2.8(g), (as it then
existed),

or

Code

Stockings

of

filed

Judicial
their

Administration

Notice

of

Rule

Objections

to

4-501(9).
Proposed

Findings in Order of Dismissal on January 25, 1989 (Record 274).
The Stockings pointed
hearing

to which

out

that

the Court

had

denied

them

the

they were entitled by Rule 4-501(9), Code of

Judicial Administration. Stockings also argued that the Defendants
had

not shown that having a trial would be prejudicial

Defendants.

to the

The Stockings finally noted that the Court had set a

trial date (Record 273-82), and had believed that all the parties
relied on that setting because no one objected when it was made.
Nevertheless, the Court signed a Dismissal with Prejudice January
27, 1989 (Record, 289), and this appeal followed.
Plaintiffs' Motion for a Mew Trial was filed February 6, 1989
(Record, 291). An order denying the same was filed March 14, 1989
(Record, 305) . The Notice of Appeal was filed with the trial court
April 11, 1989 (Record, 307).
4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Failure of the trial court to grant the Stockings a hearing
before dismissing under Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., ought to be considered reversible error and an abuse of discretion.

This court

should also rule on the merits, as shown in the pleadings, that the
trial court did not give Plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard and
to do justice, and order that the case be set for trial.
Prior rulings by the trial court and affidavits submitted by
the Stockings adequately show there are issues which need to be
tried.

The Court actually allowed the matter to be set on the

trial calendar during the pendency of the Motion to Dismiss, and
no objections were raised to the trial settings.

During the pro-

ceedings on this case, somewhat related issues were being litigated
between Mr. Stocking and the Barbers in other cases involving the
same court and the same judge.

The judge's decision is on appeal

in a related case before the Utah Supreme Court.
Although the appeals court has upheld dismissing cases under
Rule 41(b), the other cases were situations where the parties
failed to show up for trial or there had been no activity for more
than the one year Plaintiffs were not directly active in this case.
The Stockings Motion for a "Mew Trial," after the court dismissed on a motion, was procedurally correct.
with the Utah Court of Appeals decision

It is consistent

in Moon Lake Electric

Assoc., Inc. v. Ultra Systems Western Const., 767 P.2d. 125 (Utah
App . 1988) .

5

ARGUMENT
I .
THE TRIAL COURT DID MOT DO JUSTICE TO THE STOCKINGS IN
DISMISSING THE CASE UNDER RULE 4 K b ) .
If the trial court's decision to dismiss does not do justice
to the parties, the trial court abused
substantial
party,

prejudice or

the opportunity

important

that

moving

its discretion.

injustice will

to be heard
calendars

result

should

along.

Unless

to the adverse

be considered

West inghouse

more

Electric

Supply v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d. 876 (Utah
1975).

While trial courts have broad discretion to decide whether

a claim has been pursued with due diligence, if it appears the
trial court abused
injustice

has

its discretion and there is a likelihood an

been

done, an

appeals

court

should

review

the

dismissal.

Department of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d.

1323,

(Utah

1324

1980).

The appeals court

should

review

the

history of this case to see whether dismissing it would result in
an injustice.

A review of the facts shows Stockings have not had

an opportunity to be heard equivalent to the opportunities to be
heard in cases where 4 K b ) motions have been upheld.
In Utah

Oil Co. v. Harris 565 P.2d.

1135

(Utah

1987), a

sixteen-month lapse after a pre-trial conference had been suspended
for settlement negotiations was held not to be too long. The court
said that during that time either party could have requested an
earlier trial setting.

When neither party had obtained a trial

setting, the court found that such a lapse was acceptable, and the
6

trial court's dismissal under Rule 41 was reversed.
applies the standard

Utah Oil Co,

for review, and this case, like that one,

should be remanded for trial.
Defendants convinced the trial court to decide the five years
between November

1983 and December

1988 was enough

to order a

dismissal. They have referred to Brasher Motor and Finance Company
v. Richard A. Brown, 23 Utah 2d. 247, 461 P.2d. 464 (1969).
trial

court

in Brasher

waited

five and

one-half

The

years before

dismissing the action. The time period is the only similarity with
the present case, however.
for that 5'£ years:

In Brasher there had been no activity

no discovery, no motions, and no rulings that

there were questions of fact.

The decision by Justice Henriod

acknowledges that after a Complaint for Replevin was filed by a car
company, the sheriff could not find the property, and that a Counterclaim was filed a month later "as long as a hippie's hairdo."
The Plaintiffs then moved to dismiss, and the case sat dormant:
Thereafter everyone treated the litigation
with a silent reverence accorded to that which
is interred, until, low and behold, 5'<6 years
later the Browns, like Abou Ben Adhem, awoke
from a deep dream of peace and attempted to
exhume and reactive what for all intents and
purposes appeared to have been a litigious
corpse.
The matter was brought to the attention of the
trial judge, who on his own motion dismissed
the whole works, Brasher's Complaint and
Brown's Counterclaim, id., at 464.
The present case should not be equated with Brasher . There has not
been a five year period of total silence and inactivity. The trial

7

court here had already ruled that Stockings have a right to have
the facts heard•
Another case the trial court could have been persuaded by, but
which is distinguishable, is Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d. 1323
(Utah 1975) . Maxfield had been set for trial before the dismissal
was granted.

The action was filed in October 1972, and a trial

setting made for October 1974. The court set the trial date months
in advance, and Plaintiff had objected. However, the objection had
not been heard and the trial date remained on the calendar.
the parties appeared

for

trial, the Plaintiff did

When

not have an

expert witness for this malpractice action and moved to continue
the matter. The trial court dismissed the case. The dismissal was
upheld on appeal.

However, a dissent was filed in which Justices

El let and Maughan said the Plaintiff should have been allowed to
produce what evidence he had, and used the trial date, even if his
motion to continue had not been granted.

Because a trial date had

already been set, the opportunity to do justice to the parties was
far more established than it has been in the instant case, where
the parties have never backed away from an actual trial date.
The Defendants1 here mostly relied upon a decision from the
Utah Appeals Court entitled Charlie Brown Construction Company v.
Leisure Sports

Incorporated, 470 P.2d.

1368

(Utah

App.

However, this case should also not be controlling here.
date had also been set
settlement appeared

in that case.

imminent.

1987).
A trial

On the eve of trial, a

No one appeared for the June 18,

1984, trial, so the trial court dismissed the matter.
8

Apparently

settlement did not result, and the dismissal did not come to the
parties* attention for another seven months.

March 18, 1985, a

hearing

to Set

was held

on

the Plaintiff's

Motion

Aside

the

Dismissal.

After reviewing the entire file, which included the

history of

the case and

protective

orders, the

the history of
trial

court

the discovery and

stuck

with

the

the dismissal.

Nowhere does it appear in the opinion that the trial court made any
ruling on the merits of the case, such as it would have done had
there been Motions for Summary Judgment.

The facts in Char 1ie

Brown are not close enough to the instant case to justify using it
as a precedent.

Stockings did not miss a court date.

There were

questions of fact.
Similarly, the citation

in Charlie Brown to Lake Meredith

Reservoir Company v. Amity Mutual

Irrigation Company, 698 P.2d.

1340 (Colo. 1985) does not suggest facts sufficiently related to
the present case sufficient to justify dismissing the action.

The

value of the Lake Meredith decision is to show that the present
action, pending

for

five years, and

during

which

Defendants'

Summary Judgment motions were denied, should go to trial.

The

Stockings may have been slow, but they were not inactive.

Lake

Meredith is the classic example of what inactive lawsuits can be
like.

The complaint was filed

dismissal in 1983.

in 1931 and finally resolved by

That is 52 years.

After 1931, the Defendants

moved the case into the Federal Court for diversity reasons, where
it sat

for eight

years.

After Defendants' identities changed

because of assignments of various
9

irrigation rights, the case

returned to Colorado State courts until 1944. when it was dismissed
without prejudice.
filed in 1944.

Plaintiffs refiled the case and an Answer was

In 1945, a Stipulation was entered, by which the

parties (but not the Court) agreed the case would not be set for
trial, but held on the Court's docket.
to dismiss; the Motion was denied.

In 1947, Defendants moved

In 1949, the case was retired

from the Court's docket on the judge's motion, but not dismissed.
In 1982, Plaintiff moved the case

to the Colorado water court, and

in 1983, moved for Summary Judgment on some of the issues.

In

1983, additional Defendants moved to intervene and to dismiss for
lack of prosecution.
years since

The case was dismissed, but it had been 52

it was filed, and

37 since

it was refiled.

The

Colorado court considered this "an unusual delay" and approved the
dismissal, saying the trial court had that much discretion.

The

Court agreed that 37 years was an unusual period for no activity.
In the appeal, the trial court considered not only the Plaintiff's
efforts in 1983 to resume prosecution, but the length of the delay,
the reasons for the delay, the prejudice to the Defendants, the
difficulties of trying the case at such a late date, and held it
appropriate for the trial court to consider all these things and
inquire into the totality of the circumstances surrounding

the

delay.
In

the

instant

case, the

trial

court

failed

to make

an

adequate inquiry into the totality of the circumstances outlined
in Lake Meredith, and in so failing, abused its discretion.
factual

issue

in Lake Meredith

was the effect a water
10

One

storage

reservoir would have on irrigation in the area.

The appeals court

thought that between 1945 and 1983 the parties could have developed
some opinions.

That is the closest the Colorado court came to the

merits of the action.

In the present case, the court actually

reviewed the merits, and found the Plaintiffs should be able to go
to Court.

It did not justify dismissing the case, using the same

or similar review standards approved
Charlie Brown decision.

from Lake Meredith

in the

Stockings did not nearly approach the

failures to prosecute shown in the Charlie Brown and Lake Meredith
examples.

Those cases support Stockings1 claim that the trial

court abused its discretion.
The

following

elements

demonstrate

the

court's

discretion in the present action:
1.

The Court has already denied motions by both
groups of Defendants for summary judgment,
holding there were issues of fact which should
be tried.

2.

Defendants could have requested trial in 1988,
during which time neither party filed pleadings
with the Court, but did not.

3.

The Plaintiffs were busy with the Barber group
of Defendants before the same Judge in the same
Court. One action involved writs and the Court
of Appeals' decision on the original judgment;
the other involved the effort to renew the
judgment, and is now briefed before this Court.

4.

There was no pretrial conference and no trial
set, so Plaintiffs were not ignoring an opportunity to be heard.

5.

When Defendants' Motion was made, Plaintiffs
immediately requested trial and paid the jury
fee.
Before the Court ruled on the Motion,
the Court actually accepted the fee and set
the matter for trial.
11

abuse

of

6.

Plaintiffs also
requested
a hearing
on
Defendants' Motion, which was not granted.

7.

During the first four years of the action,
there was considerable activity, before the
same Judge, involving the Plaintiffs and the
Barber group of Defendants, plus discovery
requests by
Plaintiffs, and the denial of
summary judgment, against the Defendants.
II.
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS PROPER AFTER
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS GRANTED.

Rule 59(a) U.R.C.P. has been interpreted by the Utah Court of
Appeals to allow a motion for a new trial even when there has not,
in fact, been a "trial.11

Moon Lake Electric A s s o c , Inc. v. Ultra

Systems Western Constr., Inc . , 767 P.2d. 125 (Utah App. 1988).

The

Court of Appeals held that while Rules 59 and 55 do not address the
availability

of

a motion

for

a

"new"

trial

following

Summary

Judgment, that such a motion was nevertheless procedurally correct.
The Court said:
Neither Utah R. of Civ. P. 59 (new trial) nor
Utah R. of Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment)
directly addresses the availability of the
motion for a "new" trial following summary
judgment. Our analysis of Rule 59(a) and the
rationale behind it leads us to conclude that
such a motion is, nonetheless, procedurally
correct.
Thereafter,

the

Court's

analysis

followed,

including

holding that :
The concept of a new trial under Rule 59 is
broad enough to include a rehearing of any
matter decided by the Court without a jury. .
. While there may be some logic in concluding that there can be no new trial where
no trial has yet occurred, we should be less
concerned with what this "reconsideration"
12

the

procedure may be called, so long as the procedure is available to litigants.
One of Defendants' arguments to the trial court was there had
been no trial, so the Motion was not properly taken. This argument
seems to have been accepted by Judge Chr istof fersen, but
contrary to the holding of the Utah Appeals Court

it is

in Moon Lake.

The Moon Lake opinion, made December 29, 1988, was relied on by the
Stockings in requesting the trial court to review the case under
Rules 59(a)(1), and (7) (Record, 291-93).

In the motion for a new

trial, the Stockings asserted the court had abused its discretion
and made errors in law.

This argument is amply supported by the

facts and law recited herein.

There is not a legal precedent for

dismissing a case which has been inactive for only a year, which
was never set for trial, and in which the delay was not unusual.
The interests of justice, moreover, require that the parties have
an opportunity to be heard.

The only trial setting the Court ever

made in this matter was scrapped by the Court before the date
arrived.
Defendants*

argument

to

Jewkes, 761

the
P.2d.

trial
1375

court

1988),

relied
is

on

Christenson

v.

misplaced.

That case discusses the trial court's discretion in

considering motions for a new trial.

(Utah

which

also

In Christenson, trial had

previously been set, and a jury trial held.

The court refused to

grant a new trial because the court had previously set the trial
date.

It said trial would go forward even if the discovery had

not been completed.

Plaintiffs there had asked for a new trial
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because the jury voted with the Defendant.

The Christenson appeal

decision said that the jury's verdict was supportable even without
contested expert testimony.

Thus, Christenson deals with whether

a new trial should have been granted where trial before a jury had
already taken place, and the court found the jury verdict to have
been adequately supported.

It demonstrates the intent to allow

parties the chance to be heard and to have justice done.

That

intention has not been manifested by the trial court in this case.
III.
STOCKINGS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE TRIAL COURT'S
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND/OR FAILURE TO
HOLD THE REQUIRED HEARING.
Where

a

motion would

resolve

opposing

the case
the

motion

against

the party

opposing

it, the party

is entitled

to a

hearing.

Under prior Rule of Practice 2.8(g), which is now Rule

4-501(9) in the Code of Judicial Administration, the Stockings were
entitled to the hearing they requested, but did not get:
In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issues thereon on
the merits with prejudice, the party resisting
the motion may request a hearing and such
request shal1 be granted . . . (emphasis
supplied) .
It

was

not

necessary

for

Stockings

to

submit

affidavits

concerning why they had not requested a trial setting earlier or
done additional discovery.

The court had already ruled, against

both groups of Defendants, that there were facts which had to be
tried.

Affidavits supporting

those

record.

Moreover, Rule 4-501(9), Code of Judicial Administration,
14

facts were already

in the

says that in the motion such as Defendants1 Rule 41(b) motion, the
party resisting the motion may request a hearing and the request
shall be granted.

In Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d. 649 (Utah App.

1987) the Court held:
According to the Utah Supreme Court , the
meaning of the word "shall" is usually or
ordinarily presumed to be mandatory. Herr v.
Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d. 728 (Utah 1974);
State v. Zeimer, 10 Utah 2d. 45, 347 P.2d.
1111 (1960) .
When Stockings asked

for a hearing December 9, 1988, they

expected to get one.

They did not expect the case would be ruled

on without a hearing.

In fact, they thought the Defendants' motion

had

been denied

because

they

next

received

a Notice of Trial

Setting from the Court. One reason for a hearing is that the trial
court, in exercising its discretion, has to face the parties.

It

is possible all the matters could have been presented to the Court
in

writing, but

that

is

not

the

point,

The

Court

had

the

obligation to grant a hearing to hear whatever may have been said,
again or in addition, before granting such a motion.
court abused its discretion in not doing this.

This trial

Whatever analysis

the Defendants give to Plaintiffs' reasons for not having moved
ahead

sooner, the

duty

of

the

trial

court

was

to allow

the

Plaintiffs to justify what they were doing at a hearing. The court
did not perform its duty.
CONCLUSION
The Defendants have acknowledged there may have been reversible procedural error in the trial court's failure to not have the
15

hearing Stockings requested.

Now that the case is on appeal, the

hearing phase could be eliminated and the case directly remanded
for trial on the merits.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to have an

opportunity to be heard and to do justice.

In cases where Rule

41(b) dismissals have been sustained, trial has been set or there
has been no activity

for

Plaintiffs

very

were

not

far more than the one? year period
active

in

this

particular

case.

Plaintiffs had no duty to submit additional data to the trial court
justifying their delay, where affidavits in the file and prior
rulings by the court had previously held there were issues which
must be tried. The court certainly knew about the related actions
between the Stockings and the Barbers.

It appeared ready to get

rid of the Stockings and everyone associated with them, quickly if
possible.

The Barber v. Emporium matter is on appeal to the Utah

Supreme Court (No. 880410) as a result of the same attitude by the
same judge.

In this case, Stockings seek the value of their

property in excess of what was owed on the Trust Deed Note because
they had relied, to their detriment, on the actions of First
Federal, the Trustee, the Barbers, and Mr. Daines about the Trust
Deed Foreclosure.
In the related

appeal

Barber

v. Emporium, Mr. Stocking

challenges Barbers' and the trial court's improvements to a prior
judgment in connection with renewing it, and appeal the court's
refusal to allow offsets required by law and by equity.

Trial of

this present case would allow a measurement of the damages to
Stockings for the value of their property in excess of the Trust
16

Deed Note.

The two appeals are closely related.

Barbers had

admitted they were only interested in the Stockings* house at First
Federal's Trust Deed Sale because of their prior judgment (Record,
Supreme Court Appeal No. 880410, pp. 14-17, set out in Addendum
Item 4 of Appellant's Brief in the same case).

Mrs. Stocking is

a party to this suit, but is not a party in the other suit.
The Stockings believe they are victims of judicial prejudice
or abuse of discretion by Judge Christoffersen's rulings in both
this case and Case No. 880410 that is also on appeal.

They ask

this court to remand the case for trial, and grant the Appellants
attorney's fees and costs on appeal as allowed by Rule 33 and 34
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Respectfully submitted this

day of July, 1989.

Raymond N. Malouf
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of July, 1989, four true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, Case No.
890345-CA, was mailed postage prepaid to each of the following:
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq.
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys for
Defendants/Respondents
56 West Center
Logan, Utah 84321

N. George Daines, Esq.
DAINES & KANE
Attorneys for
Defendants/Respondents
108 North Main, Suite 201
Logan, UT 84321

Raymond N. Malouf
17

ADDENDUM

Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice,
Record 286-290 •
Notice of Objections to Proposed Findings and Order of
Dismissal, Record 274-282.
Motion for New Trial and Memorandum, Record 291-296.
Responses to Motion, Record 297-300.
Reply by Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for New Trial,
Record 301-303.
Memorandum Decision, March
Judgment, Record 129-130.

19, 1984, denying

Summary

Memorandum Decision, October 7, 1987, denying Summary
Judgment, Record 215.
Memorandum Decision and Order, Record 304-306.
Notice of Appeal, Record 307-308.
Appellants also request the Court take judicial notice
of Appeal No. 881410, currently before the Utah Supreme
Court, including pages 14-17 thereof which are included
here.
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512)
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys at Law
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321-0525
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED
HUNSAKER and BRIAN CHADAZ as
officers and as individuals;
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee;
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
successor beneficiaries;
N. GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN
DOES 1-8,

Civil No. 22183

Defendants.

In this matter Defendants First Federal Savings & Loan
Association of Logan, Fred Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz and Brad H.
Bearnson, filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 41(b) to dismiss
Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute the
same and therewith filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of said Motion, and Defendants Norman Barber, Helen
Barber, and N. George Daines joined in said Motion in writing.
Plaintiffs objected to said Motion and filed their objection with
a Memorandum in support thereof in writing. The Court having read

4-

-2and considered said Motions and the Memoranda in support and
opposition thereto, having examined the file, and on January 19,
1989 having made its Memorandum Decision in writing, now makes the]
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

\CfSC ?

^

From the record in the file on this matter, the C^u^t^ finds:
1. Plaintiffs1 Complaint was filed November 3 , / ^ 2 a n d a
Temporary Restraining Order was issued the same day to restrain
Defendants First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, Fred
Hunsaker, Bri an Chadaz and Brad H. Bearnson from proceeding with B\
Trusteefs sale of Plaintiffs1 property*
2. The Trustee's sale scheduled November 3, 1983 was
postponed one (1) day to November 4, 1983, and on November 4,
1983, a hearing was held before the Honorable VeNoy Chris toffersen]
on Plaintiffs1 Temporary Restraining Order. As a result of the
hearing, Plaintiffs' Temporary Restraining Order was dismissed on
November 4, 1983, and the Trustee's sale as rescheduled was
conducted the same day.
3. On November 7, 1983, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker,
Chadaz and Bearnson filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint.
4. On November 28, 1983, Plaintiffs filed an Amended
Complaint.
5. On December 8, 1983, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker,
Chadaz and Bearnson filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint.
6. On February 3, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker,
Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Motion For Partial Summary Judgment,
which was denied by the Court in a Memorandum Decision dated Marchj
19, 1984.
7. On March 21, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker,
Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Notice of Readiness for Trial.

-3Plaintiffs objected to the Notice on April 2, 1984, stating in
their objection, "Plaintiffs intend to prepare and complete
discovery both with interrogatories and depositions."
8. On July 6, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker,
Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Second Notice of Readiness for Trial,
to which Plaintiffs objected stating, "... plaintiffs are
proceeding with discovery.11
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9. On July 11, 1984, Plaintiffs served Interrogatories and a
Request For Admission on Defendants Chadaz and Bearnson, to which
Bearnson filed Answers on July 18, 1984 and Chadaz filed Answers
on August 10, 1984.
10. On January 13, 1986, the Court, on its own motion,
issued an Order returnable January 27, 1986 for Plaintiffs to show
cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute the same.
11. On January 23, 1986, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the
Court*s Order to Show Cause and in their Motion stated, "Plaintiffs intend to bring this matter to trial after their evidence
has been completed. The appraiser has not completed the work he
indicated would be done sometime ago and Plaintiffs are reminding
him of the commitment to complete the work."
12. On January 27, 1987, the Court, on its own motion,
issued an Order, returnable February 9, 1987, for Plaintiffs to
show cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to prosecute the same.
13. On February 5, 1987, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the
f
Court s Order to Show Cause, and in their motion stated, "Plaintiffs have not left this case unpursued, but have been preparing
to go forward with it. ... They desire that this matter eventually
be set for trial, and anticipate being ready to file a request
within the year."

.4.
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14. On February 6, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Set of
Request For Admissions, First Set of Interrogatories and For
Production of Documents" on Defendants Barber. These discovery
requests were answered by Defendants Barber on March 11, 1987.
15. On September 4, 1987, Defendants Barber moved the Court
for partial summary judgment, which motion was denied by the
Courts Memorandum Decision dated October 6, 1987.
16. On November 25, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Set of
Interrogatories" on Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, Chadaz and
Bearnson. Defendants First Federal and Hunsaker answered the
Interrogatories on December 23, 1987; Defendant Bearnson answered
the Interrogatories on December 22, 1987, and Defendant Chadaz
answered the Interrogatories on December 23, 1987.
17. No action has been taken by Plaintiffs on their claim
since December 23, 1987.
18. Based upon the foregoing Findings from the record in the
file, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to prosecute
their claims in this case in due course and without unreasonable
delay.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
concludes that Plaintiffs1 Complaint and all claims therein should
be dismissed with prejudice.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that
Plaintiffs1 Complaint and all claims therein as against all
Defendants be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that the trial date for this case of
April 11, 1989 as a second setting and May 23, 1989 as a first
setting be and are stricken.
DATED this €^j day of January, 1989.

-5CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that an exact copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice was served upon Plaintiffs1 counsel, Raymond N. Malouf, personally by delivering a copy
to his office at 150 East 200 North in Logan, Utah this 20th
day of January, 1989, and that an exact copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice was served
upon N. George Daines, III, Attorney for Defendants Barber,
personally by delivering a copy to his office at 108 North Main,
Suite 200, Logan, Utah, this 20th day of January, 1989.

TTttany
Secretary to L. Brent Hoggan
LBH/20

&HOGGAN
tYS AT UAW
*T CENTEH
•OX 525
UTAH 84321
792-1 M l
TON OFFICE:
AST MAIN
IOX t 1 5
N. UTAH 84302
157 38SS

Raymond N. Malcuf/md (#2067)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
150 East 200 North. Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE. STATE OF UTAH
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife.
Plaintiffs.
vs.

NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS TO
PROPOSED
FINDINGS
AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, et. al.
Defendants*

Civil No. 22183

Come now the Plaintiffs and serve Notice of their Objections
to the proposed Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal.
is also
Decision.

given

of

objections

to

the

entry

of

the

Notice

Memorandum

The objections are as follows*
ABSENCE OF HEARING VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS1 RIGHTS

1.

Entry

of

the

Findings and Dismissal
Administration

Memorandum

Decision

and

the

proposed

violate Rule 4-501(9). Code of Judicial

(C.J.A.) which provides as follows:

In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issues thereon on
the merits with prejudice, the party resisting
the motion may request a hearing and such
request shall be granted . . .
December 8. 1983. the Plaintiffs requested this matter be set for
hearing under Rule of Practice 2.8(g) . Rules of Practice.
2.8(g) was replaced by C.J.A. Rule 4-501(9).
rules is identical.

Rule

The language in both

It is not optional whether a hearing will be

granted. A hearing was timely requested but was not granted.

This

denied the Plaintiffs the due process they are entitled to*

The

court has no authority, under these Rules, to issue a Memorandum

1

JAN 2 5 1*49

Decision dismissing the Plaintiffs* cause of action with prejudice,
without a hearing.
Entry of such an Order, and entry of the
Memorandum Decision, may also show prejudice on the part of the
court, and violate Cannons 2 & 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct*
A TRIAL DATE WAS ALREADY SET
2.
This case was already set for trial before the Memorandum
Decision,
December 8, 1988 the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of
Readiness for Trial, requesting the matter be set for a jury trial,
and tendered the jury fee. The jury fee was accepted by the court
December 9, 1988, and had the name of the Judge imprinted on the
receipt. Within the Notice of Readiness for Trial was a Notice that
opposing counsel had 10 days to object to the Request for Trial
Setting. There was no objection filed by either opposing counsel.
On December 21, 1988, the court sent notice that trial was set
for April 11-13 (or May 23-25) to all counsel. None of the parties
objected to those settings. To dismiss with prejudice denies to
the Plaintiffs their right to go to court. On December 20, 1988,
the moving Defendants1 Reply Memorandum acknowledged that the
Request for a Trial Setting had been filed. Notice of the trial
dates was given December 21, 1988. Plaintiffs, and apparently all
the parties, considered this a response denying the Defendants'
Motion for dismissal.
Copies of the Request for Trial Setting, Receipt, and Notice
of Setting are attached to this Notice of Objections.
TRIAL REQUEST WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS
3.
Betweeen the November 25, 1988 Motion to Dismiss, and the
filing of Barbers' and their attorney's Response to Request for
Production of Documents in January, 1988, there is approximately
11 months.
While it is true that the Plaintiffs could have
requested a trial setting during that 11 month period of time, it
is also true that the Defendants could have requested one too.
Granting the Motion to Dismiss prejudices Plaintiffs, who were also

2

busy with cases related to some of these Defendants.

The court

already denied separate motions by both groups of Defendants for
Summary Judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact.
Unlike Charlie Brown, an actual

trial setting was not

ignored.

Only 14 months have lapsed since the court denied Summary Judgment
for the Barbers, and 11 months since Barbers answered Plaintiffs'
last discovery request.

In Utah Oil, a 16 month lapse was not: too

long for nothing to happen.
Defendants

Barbers

during

Lots happened between Plaintiffs and
the

11

months.

In

Case

No .25616,

numerous pleadings were filed between the Plaintiffs and the Barber
group of Defendants. One of the issues there was whether the court
should allow Summary
judgment.

Judgment

to the Barbers to renew a prior

The court allowed it, and Stocking is appealing.

25616 the court was reminded

it allowed

In No.

the Stockings to pursue

their claim for equitable offsets, against; the Renewal Judgment and
against Barbers, by this lawsuit
wrongful
Motion

taking

of Stockings

here, without

1

(No. 22183) which addresses the

property.

a hearing,

To grant

is unfair

and

Defendants*

shows

judicial

prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Granting the Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice is an abuse of
the court 's discretion because it violates Rule of Practice 2.8(g) ,
it violates Rule 4-501(9) of the Code of Judicial Administration;
it overlooks the fact that a trial setting was already made, with
jury fee and Notice of Readiness accepted by the court, before a
ruling

was

made

on

this

Motion;

and

ignores

the

merits

of

Plaintiffs' case conflicting with prior orders. The 11 month lapse
before granting Defendants* Motions was not idle time.

The court

should use its discretion to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to
be heard, and not sign the proposed Findings and Order.
Dated this 25th day of January, 1989./—)
Raymoytcf N . Malouf
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of January, 1989
a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS TO
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL, Civil No. 22183, mailed
postage prepaid to the following:
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq.
Post Office Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321

N. George Daines, Esq.
108 North Main #201
Logan, Utah 84321

)<y?\/ck, cdkM*^a.*<j
Secretary

Raymond N. Malouf/md (#2067)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
ISO East 200 North. Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
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VON Ki STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife,
NOTICE OF READINESS FOR TRIAL
Plaintiffs,

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN,
Civil No. 22163
Defendants.
TO THE JUDGE OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for
the Plaintiffs herewith certifies:
it
He has interviewed all known witnesses who might be
called upon in the trial of the case.
2t
That such drawings, documents, physical evidence and/or
other exhibits as they may choose to offer are prepared or will be
prepared and ready by any expected trial date.
3#
That such use of the rules of discovery as counsel feels
necessary for the trial of this cause have been completed and the
case is at issue.
4.
That all the examinations and depositions which counsel
feels necessary have been concluded.
5.
That the parties hereto have attempted settlement, but
settlement at this time cannot be made.
6.
Counsel does desire pretrial.
7.
Counsel requests a jury trial.

1

8#
Expected time for trial is three (3) days.
9t
The below signed attorney represents the statements made
herein are true and correct and requests the court to act in
reliance thereon*
10.
A copy hereof was mailed this date to I. Brent Hoggan,
Esq., at Post Office Box 525, Logan, Utoh, and N. George Daines,
Esq. at 108 North M a m , Suite 201, Logan, Utah.
OPPOSING COUNSEL HAS TEN (10) DAYS TO OBJECT TO ANY OF THE
ABOVE. FAILURE TO DO SO WILL BE DEEMED AS AN ACCEPTANCE.
Dated this 8th day of December, 1988,

<r
<

^--&*.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of December, 1988, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Readiness for Trial,
Civil No. 22183 was mailed postage prepaid to the following?
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq.
Post Office Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
M. George Daines, Esq.
108 North Main, Suite 201
Logan, Utah 84321
yhl^-^Ct^f

Secretary
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SAVE THIS RECEIPT *+•*:* SAVE THIS SECEJH

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

STOCKING, VON K.
STOCKING, DONNA H.

)
)

Plaintiff,
)

NOTICE OF SETTING NO.
-VS-

)

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
HUNSAKER, FRED
Defendant.

)
)

Case No.

1

830022183 CN

TO:
SEE

A T T A C H M E N T

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT THE ABOVE ENTITLED ACTION
IS SET F O R L J U R Y TRIAL I N ' T H E FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
CACHE COUNTY*TOuffH0USE, 140 NORTH 100 WEST,
LOGAN, UTAH.
DATE; 04/11/89 to 04/13/89
05/23/89 to 05/25/89

TIME: 10:00 AM, AS A SECOND SETTING
10:00 AM, AS A FIRST SETTING

* M Q U C E : The Clerk will notify counsel on cases of second settings as
soon as possible up to \ day before trial as to whether the matter will
be tried. If no objections to the above dates are received within 10
days hereof, it will be presumed said dates are satisfactory and not in
conflict with any other matters!" ""~
-•• * - - ^ « m * i « ^ .
CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing NOTICE OF SETTING, postage prepaid, to the attachedflist of
attorneys at the addresses set forth, this
c2J
day ofJLJu^yAM^
19 T& . at LOGAN, UTAH.
Seth S. Allen
CACHE County Clerk
r'

- ^0 - 'l.

I

Depaty-Clerk

*

«*?m**,
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A T T A C H M E N T
MALOUF, RAYMOND
Attorney for Plaintiff
150 EAST 200 NORTH
LOGAN
UT 84321

DAINES, N. GEORGE
Attorney for Defendant
108 NORTH MAIN
LOGAN
UT 84321

HOGGAN, L. BRENT
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. BOX 525
LOGAN
UT 84321

Raymond N . Ma 1cat/rod (#2067)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone (801) 7152-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN,
et al . ,
Defendants.

Civil No. 22183

Come now the Plaintiffs in this matter, and move for a new
trial in this matter.
Procedure 59(a)(1) and
after

entry

of

The Motion is allowed by Utah Rule of Civil
(7).

the Order

This Motion is made within 10 days

cf

Dismissal

with

Prejudice*

It

is

supported by the Affidavit of the undersigned counsel, the file,
an$ the Memorandum.
Dated this 6th day of February, 1989.

>n4 V
iJ.
Mai
Raymond
. Maloi
Attorney for PlaiVitiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February, 1989, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Civil No.
22183, was mailed postage prepaid to the following:
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq.
56 West Center
Post Office Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321-0525

N. George Daines, Esq.
108 North Main, Suite 201
Logan, Utah 84321

Secretary
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Raymond N. Halouf/md (#2067)
HALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 8432:1
Telephone (601) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN,
et al . ,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Civil No. 22183

Plaintiffs submit this Memorandum in support of the Motion for
New Trial under Rule 59(a)(1) and (7), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Rule provides for a motion for a new trial, even if there
has in fact not been a trial. See Moon Lake Electric Association,
Inc. v. Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., 870212-CA, 99 Utah
Adv. Rep. 25, December, 1988. This case involved a motion for a
new trial after summary judgment was granted. The court said:
Neither Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 (new
trial) nor Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56
(summary
judgment) directly
address
the
availability of a motion for "new" trial
following summary judgment. Our analysis of
Rule 59(a) and the rational behind it leads us
to
conclude
that
such
a
motion
is,
nonetheless, procedurally correct.
An Order of Dismissal with Prejudice entered on this case
January 27, 1989, This Motion is filed within 10 days after said
Order .
This Motion is supported by the totality of the file and
particularly the points raised by the Notice of Objections to
Proposed Findings and Order of Dismissal dated January 25, 1989,
^jThese include the following:
^\
1.
The absence of a hearing on Dismissal violated the
Plaintiffs1 rights to a hearing on the question of

dismissal under the Code of Judicial Administration Rule
4-501(9) .
2.
A trial date was set before the court entered its
Order Dismissing with Prejudice. Plaintiffs should be.
entitled to have a trial.
3.
It is not prejudicial to the Defendants, under the
circumstances, to be forced to go to trial on the
questions raised by the Plaintiffs* Complaint.
The court had already ruled on two previous occasions that
material

disputed questions of fact are present, sufficient

to

require trial, and denied two motions for summary judgment.
Regarding the merits of the action, besides the question of
whether

Plaintiffs

did

or

did

not

Defendants were obligated to perform

have

an

agreement

which

in connection with a trust

deed sale, this case involves the question of whether Defendants
were equitably
Equitable

estopped

estoppel

Equitable

is

estoppel

from selling
claimed
is

the property

against

"conduct

by

all
one

the
party

to Barbers.
Defendants.
which

leads

another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action
resulting

in detriment or damage if the first party is permitted

to repudiate his conduct."

Blackhurst v. Transamerica Insurance

Company, 699 P.2d 686, 691 (Utah 1985).

Such a finding is believed

by the Plaintiff to be expected because of the facts in this case.
Affidavits by Von Stocking, which are part

of

the cased

file,

attest to the fact that the Plaintiff did rely to his detriment on
representations made by each of the groups of Defendants herein.
Motion for a new trial should be granted and the prior Order
set aside.
Dated this 6th day of February, 1989,,

Raynnona N. MalobJ1
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February, 1989, a true
and correct copy cf the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL Civil Mo. 22183, was mailed postage prepaid to the
following:
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq•
56 West Center
Post Office Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321-0525

N. George Daines, Esq.
108 North Main, Suite 201
Logan, Utah 84321

Secretary

'i&&tLceu&L-

B*ym#nr4 W. M*louf/md ($2067)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife.
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN,
et al . ,
Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND N. MALOUF

Civil No. 22163

)
~
"
"™
) ss.
COUNTY OF CACHE
)
The undersigned, Raymond N. Malouf, being first duly sworn,
states the following of his own personal knowledge and beliefs
STATE OF UTAH

1.

I am the attorney representing

the Plaintiffs herein.

2.

Plaintiffs* case was brought and

is maintained

in good

faith, and the Flaintiffs desire to resolve the disputes with the
Defendants.
3.
as

Plaintiffs have moved

forward with

the case as quickly

their schedule ana counsel's schedule would allow, in view of

the limited discovery responses and the totality of events needing
their attention.
4.

The

undersigned

knows

the Plaintiffs

olesire

to go

to

trial on this matter, and that a trial dare has been set and not
vacated.
5.

The undersigned believes the Law entitles his clients to

go to court

for the reasons set forth

in the pleadings heretofor

filed, and that failure to allow this matter to go to trial would
constitute an irregularity

in the proceedings of the court and an
A

error in law .

^ t| \

Dated t h i s 6 t h day of ^Felnrqary,.
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Fr

'1 mag

.

v

Ra^mortft
^C)HT'ourjj
Attorney for
Plafntiffj

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE

)
) ss.
)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me ihis
6th day of

February, 1989, by Raymond N.. Malouf , attorney for

Plaintiffs herein.

NOTARY PUBLIC
*
Residing Att Logan, Utah

Commission Expires:

"

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February, 1989, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND N. MALOUF.
Civil No. 22183. was mailed postage prepaid to the following:
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq.
56 West Center
Post Office Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321-0525

N. George Daines, Esq.
108 North Main, Suite 201
Logan. Utah 84321

>^ff£a?o&&***tA*Ct
Secretary

L. Brent Hoggan (#1512)
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys at Law
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321-0525
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR TIE COUNTY OF CACHE
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife,

)
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

vs.

)

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED
HUNSAKER AND BRIAN CHADAZ, as
officers and as individuals,
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee;
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
successor beneficiaries; N.
GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN DOES 1-8,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

RESPONSE OF DEFENDANTS
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN,
FRED HUNSAKER, BRIAN CHADAZ
AND BRAD H. BEARNSON TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL

Civil No. 22183

)

Defendants.

k HOGGAN
:YS AT LAW
rCENTER
OX 525
TAH 84321
52 1551

)

For their response to Plaintiffs' Motion For A New Trial, the
Defendants First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Logan,
Fred Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz and Brad H. Bearnson, state:
1. That there has been no trial of this case. This issue
was put to the Court on a Motion To Dismiss for failure to
prosecute and decided by the Court from the record in the file on
said Motion. It is therefore inappropriate to consider a Motion
For A New Trial when no prior trial has been held.
2. The argument set forth by Plaintiffs for a new trial is
the same argument submitted by Plaintiffs in opposition to the

FEB 0 8 |9 fl 9

Number
FILED

FED

~i %

81089

-2Motlon of these Defendants to dismiss and was considered by
the Court prior to signing the Findings and Decree. The Court
having already considered and rejected said argument, the same
should be overruled by the Court.
WHEREFORE, having replied to Plaintiffs' Motion For A New
Trial, these Defendants pray said Motion be denied.
DATED this 8th day of February, 1989.
OLSON & HOGGAN

L. Brent Hoggan
//tf
Attorney for Defendants
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of thf. foregoing
Response Of Defendants First Federal Savings And Loan Association
Of Logan, Fred Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz And Brad Bearnson To
Plaintiffs' Motion For A New Trial, to Plaintiffs' Attorney,
Raymond N. Malouf, at 150 East 200 North, Suite D, Logan, Utah
84321; and to N. George Daines, Attorney for himself and
Defendants Barber, at 108 North Main, Suite 200, Logan, Utah
84321, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 8th day of February,
1989.

L. Brent Hoggan
LBH/8

N. George Daines « 0303
DAINES & KANE
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-4403
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife,

*
*

Plaintiffs,
*

RESPONSE TO MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

*

Civil No. 22183

VS.

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN,
et al.,

*

Defendants,
COME NOW the Defendants DAINES & KANE and Norman and Helen
Barber and respond to Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial as
follows:
1.

The Affidavit of Raymond N, Malouf and the attached

Memorandum in support of motion add no further information to the
court

that

was

not

available

at

the

time

that

the

court

previously ruled in this matter.

It is obvious from the records

that Plaintiffs have not moved

this matter

forward aid have

objected to the Defendants efforts to do so.

These objections

have gone on long enough that a dismissal as ordered by the court
is entirely appropriate and regular.
WHEREFORE

Defendants pray that the court denies Plaintiffs

Motion for a new trial.
phpr

p\ DATED this

*#

day of February, 1989.

flB 0 9 1$6t
B 9 1989

DAINES & KANE

1/ ^"

/

/

/

/N. Geo/tje Dairies

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

that

a true

and correct

copy of the

foregoing Response to Motion for New Trial was mailed this _ J 2
day of February,, ]909 to the following:
L. Brent Hoggan
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, UT 84321
Raymond N. Malouf
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, UT 84321

Qjj/

Secretary

D891/4108
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Raymond N. Malcuf/'md (#2067)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT C0U2T
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife.
Plaintiffs,
vs.

REPLY BY THE PLAINTIFFS IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN,
et al • ,
Defendants.

Civil No. 22183

In supuort of its Motion for New Trial. Plaintiffs Reply, and
show the Court:
1.

The Motion by Von K. Stocking and Donna H. Stocking for

a New Trial is a legitimate request.

In Plaintiffs' Memorandum,

reference was made to Moon Lake Electric Association, 99 U.A.R* 25,
* December, 1988. Defendants have not attempted to distinguish that
case.

Clearly, there does not need to be a "trial" before this

Motion is made.
2»

Plaintiffs remind

the Court that

Plaintiffs a hearing, contrary
Judicial Administration.

it never granted the

to Rule 4-501(9) of the Code of

Plaintiffs are entitled

Just because the Court did not grant

to a hearing.

it does not mean that the

Court intentionally failed to grant it. Defendants have failed to
show why a hearing is not required.
the Motion, the Court

In asking the Court to deny

is being asked to compound

its failure to

follow Rules Plaintiffs are entitled to expect the Court to follow.
3.

Defendants have failed to justify the fact that this case

was set for a ]ur/ trial prior to the time the Court granted the

Q

Defendants* Motion to Dismiss under Rule 41»h).
4.

It was not until October 6,

Berbers* Motion

i or Summary

Judgment

saying there were issues of fact.

1937 that the Defendants
was denied

by

this Court

The action was inin.illv f ; I * 1

by the Plaintiffs November 3, 1982. The Defendants were obviously
willing to allow the matter to sit for five years.

The additional

delay between October 1957 and when trial was actually set is not
inconsistent with the case.

The Utah Supreme Court has previously

reversed Rule 41(b) dismissals for lesser reasons.

See Utah Oil

Company

Westlnghouse

v. Harris, 565 P.2d

Electric Supply

1155

(Utah

1977) and

v» Paul Larsen , 544 P. 2d 876

ill t ah 1975) •

In

West i nqhouse, the Court said it is commendable to get mattes on the
trial calendar, but said it was even more important to keep in mind
that the reason for courts was to afford people the opportunity to
have justice finally done.
5.

Where the Court has denied Motions for Summary Judgment

made by each of the Defendants in the past, equity requires that
this matter go to trial. For whatever reason the delay, the matter
is on

the

trial

calendar

and

the Plaintiffs have expressed

willingness to move the case forward now,

a

Defendants have failed

to show how the deiay has been prejudicial, and have themselves
acquiesced in most of the delay.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have adequately shown that the facts justify
presentation at trial.

A jury trial has been set.

The Plaintiffs

moved for a New Trial on the issue of whether any delay has been
prejudicial.

The Defendants have failed to show how the delay l:xs

been prejudicial.

Dismissal of the action under Rule 41(b) is not

rational, but is prejudicial against the P Lai nt i f f s ' legal rigtt.-s.
The Defendants have each failed to show any good reason why trial
cannot go forward now..

The Motion for a New Trial, even though

the matter has only been resolved so far by motion, is clearly a
legal one, upheld in December, 1968, by the Utah Supreme Court.
Dated this

/0

day of February, 1969„
*

^

/

S3^&iiA^:

If

)\v 7"

Raymond N. Mai our
A11 orney f or P1 aInt i ff s

s

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th d^y or February, 1989. a true
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Civil No.
22183, was mailed postage prepaid to the following:
L • Brent Hogg an , Esq .
56 West Center
Post Office Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321-0525

N . George Dalnes, Esq.
108 North Main, Suite 201
Logan, Utah 84321

Secretary

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VON K. STOCKING, and DONNA H.
STOCKING, Husband and Wife
Plaintiffs
vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED
HUNSAKER, and BRIAN CHADAZ as
officers and as individuals;
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee;
NORMAN BARBER AND HELEN BARBER
successor beneficiaries; N.
GEORGE DAINES and JOHN DOES
1-8,
Defendants

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No.

2218 3

Defendant/ First Federal Savings and Loan Association of
Logan, Fred HunsaJcer, and Brian Chadaz, Brad Bearnson, have
filed a motion for partial summary judgment alleging there are
no genuine issue of facts in regard to a breach of contract
by the plaintiff in failing to make payments when due pursuant
to written contract.
The defendants do agree there was some conversation as to
how plaintiffs may cure their default.
position they reached no accord.

It is the defendants

It is the plaintiff's

position that they were in fact in default but there were
conversations where there was an offer made by the defendants
and an accord was reached.

The affidavits supporting both

memorandums are contradictory in this regard and also on other
issues raised fcy the memorandum and affidavits.

Since tl~ey

are in conflict as to these facts, there remains issues

i±i:t

must be tried to make this determination.
Therefore, the motion for partial summary judgment by the
above named defendants is denied.

Counsel for plaintiff to

prepare the appropriate order.
Dated this

j ^

day of March, 1^84.
BY THE COURT: ••
/ r
•

••

/

/

/
i

/

;

•• • -1

.
/.. ' "

••!

)

7

x

/(,-- j? l \ A > \ *— ''
VeWoy^Cljristofferseji
District Judge
^/

*• • * k

i Ccoy oHhe abova m«il^alJ<i
Riyifl0jid..llUtolia^^Jifi4E*-2DIUia^jD,^ogan. Utah 84321
Btad-E^. B^rxi«aa-^^iI*ii.-Losan^-Uti»h-84321
ihis.Ja..../dayof-...J..:MiiJ^U-.»---,l?---S- / i.
N. George Daines
3ETH S.'ALLEN, Cfak / ,
128 No, Main
^ / (l~JUil fHr^
L°8an, Utah 84321
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY Op CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA
H. SOTCKING, husband and
wife,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaitniff
Civil No.

v.

22183

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS and
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al
Defendants

Defendants Norman Barber, Helen Barber, and N. George
Daines have filed

their motion for partial summary judgment on

the basis that the affidavits of Brian Chadaz, Mr. Brad Bearnson
and Mr. Fred Hunsaker, who were the representatives of the
defendant First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Logan,
stated under oath there has been no contact between First Federal
and the three defendants that would support any effort on the part
of the defendants Barter and Daines that would interfere with the
rights of the plaintiff.
This is, however, disputed by affidavits attached to plaintiff's
response that would contest the facts in the affidavits of Chadaz
Bearnson

f

and Hunsaker.

Where the facts are contested, summary

judgment is not appropriate and the motion for partial summary
judgment will be denied.
/tlouri&ei'ijpq:
,;'

plaitniffs to prepare the appropriate order.

Dated this V:::^L _day of October, 198 7,
* »S

BY TH^' COURT:'

^n/^r^c)[^ :
Of:!'?

i -••' \ . x,

. . Tr,i\

-^..- vy

, .

Vteftoy V h r l s t o r f f b r s e n

1937

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
VON K. STOCKING and
DONNA H. STOCKING, husband
and wife,

MEMO RANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff

Civil No.

V.

2 218 3

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS and
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al
Defendants

Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for a New Trial. The::e
was no trial in this case, the issue was put to the Court on a
Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute and decided by the
Court from the record on that basis.

Plaintiffs have, in their

motion, used the same arguments that were used on the prior motion.
Therefore, the Motion for a New:Trial is denied and
counsel for defendants to prepare the appropriate order.
Dated this /j^l

day of February, 1989.
BY THE COURT: /'//
J

I',

-T77.

VeNoy, 'cfrri'stiof f a ikatv '
D i s t r i c t Judge
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512)
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys at Law
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING NEW TklAL

vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED
HUNSAKER AND BRIAN CHADAZ, as
officers and as individuals,
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee;
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
successor beneficiaries; N.
GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN DOES 1-8,
Defendants.

kHOGGAN
VS AT LAW
T CfNT£R
OX 525
TAN 84321
52 1551

ON OFFICE
kST MAIN

)

In this matter the Court having made and entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree on January
27, 1989 dismissing Plaintiffs1 Complaint and all claims therein
with prejudice and Plaintiffs having thereafter filed with this
Court a Motion For New Trial and in support thereof having filed a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Defendants having filed
responsive Memorandum to said Motion For New Trial and the Plaintiff a rebuttal to Defendants' response, and the Court having
examined the Motion of Plaintiffs and the Memoranda of the parties
for and against the same, now finds that the arguments of Plaintiffs in support of their Motion For New Trial were the same

ox 1 15
UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
57 3S0J5

Civil No. 22183

HAR 0 I UW

NIT'1-* \
:

\ V. !.' C>

t«f

A.ii——

-2jarguraents submitted by Plaintiffs in their opposition to
Defendants' MotLon to Dismiss Plaintiffs1 Complaint and that there
are no new matters or arguments raised by Plaintiffs in said
Motion For New Trial and the Court on February 27, 1989 having
pade and entered its Memorandum Decision, and the Court being
(fully adivsed In the premises, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs1 Motion For New
(Trial be and the same is hereby denied.
DATED this J ^ day of March, 1989

CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL SERVICE
I hereby certify that I personally served an exact copy of
the foregoing Order Denying New Trial upon N. George Hainesy
Attorney for himself and Defendants Barber, and upon Raymond ivf.
Malouf, Attorney for Plaintiffs, by delivering a copy to each at
their law offices in Logan, Utah, this 1st day of March, 1989,

iVt fa kf P a r ^ f
S e c r e t a r y tt> L. Brent Hoggan
LBH/38

E HOGGAN
YS AT LAW
r CENTER
3X 525
TAN 84321
52 1551

>N OFFICIE:
ST MAIN
ixll5
UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
J73805

Raymond N» Malouf/bh (#2067)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and-wife,

NOTICE; OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED
HUNSAKER and BRYAN CHADAZ, as
officers and as individuals;
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee;
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
successor beneficiaries; N.
GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN DOES 1-8,

Civil No. 8300;.'i2183

Defendants.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that; Plaintiffs, Von K. Stocking and
Donna H. Stocking, through counsel, Raymond N* Malouf* appeal to
the Utah Supreme Court

the final Order of the Honorable VeMoy

Christoffersen, District Judge, entered in this matter on January
27, 1989.

Further, Plaintiffs appeal from the Court*.5. denial of

Plaintiffs1 Motion For a Mew Trial under Rule 59(a) maae February
6, 1989, which Order denying the new trial was made Marc'n 14, 1969.
The effect of the Orders appealed from was to dismiss Plaintiffs"
action under Rule 41(b) with prejudice.

N
FILED

^eSsm^Qii.i'^

APR 111983

The appeal is taken from the entire Order.
Dated this 12th day of April, 1969.

C

-N

J2&
Raymond «'. Malouf
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of April, 1969, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed
postage prepaid to the following;
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq,
56 West Center
Post Office Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321-0525
N. George Daines, Esq.
108 North Main, Suite 201
Logan, Utah 84321

(k^X.
Secretary

f|oJlTL^Q^

LAW OWICtS

D A I N E S * KANE
121 NOHTH MAIM

Mr. Raymond Malouf
25 August 1983
Page Two

LOGAN. UTAH $4321

M. OEOftOE DAIMCt
KEVIN £ KANE

29 August 198

definitive arrangements to taka care of your obligation in
this situation. Mr. Barter is insistent that you do so.
Sincerely,

Mr. Raymond Malouf
150 East 200 North #D
Logan. Utah 84321
Re;

DAINES & KANE

Barber v. Emporium
/w. George Daines
Attorney at Law

Dear Ray:
Norm Barber^aJftT I have exanined^He^Von
Stocking home and Relieve that its worth would^p robably
be somewhere in ttye range of $45-60,000.00. We 1believe
to determine its -vXalue accurately, a professiop4l appraisals ^*^7£'V
should be done. IrK^iscussing various 4appr>i^ers,
Norm
JCO '• Jf <
Barber and I felt t W ^ * ^ ? ftf?t EJpprF "^^^"1 A probably
\ ^
J^'
be Tom Singleton, but perhaps, if you have someone else in
'•*•'•''
mind, we would accept an appraisal upon advance clearance
\-'
of the individual involved.
It would be my suggestion that you prepare that
appraisal at your expense and submit it to us for our review.
Upon reviewing that we may well be able to consummate some
kind of an arrangement regarding your liability to Norm Barber.
Anticipating that this is going to take several weeks
to determine what the appraisal of that home is and the
likelihood that the home is insufficient to pay the full
amount of the judgment. T thiriK it is advisable that we
continue with the Supplemental Order that was started
this w^gi- _ Fiease consider this formal notice, pursuant
to our arrangement, that you should be prepared and at court
the next motion and order day to continue answering questions
regarding this supplemental proceedings. You should also
be advised that we have served a notice to appear on your wife*
your father and also Carl Malouf, to determine more concerning
the arrangements between yourself and these individuals.
I also anticipate preparation and perhaps filing of a lawsuit
involving fra^nhil^nf oomrryanca agninnt some of these parties.
I fees strongly that you should come forward now and make

U
ec Bora Barter

Raymond N, Malouf/dh (68:EMBAAFV.RDP)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorney for Defendants
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: 752-9380
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
husband and wife,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF VON STOCKING

vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE,
JR,, and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 25616

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss
COUNTY OF CACHE )
Comes now Von K. Stocking and being first duly sworn deposes
and states the following of his own oersonal knowledge:
1.
That he i s a Defendarit in tile apove named a c t i o n .
2.
That he was a Defendant in Civil No. 17630.
3.
That he owned the property described in book 189 page
458 in a Trust Deed given to First Federal Savings & Loan on
March 18, 1976.
4.
That the afore-described property was a home with a
basement apartment worth far in excess of $33,191.94 that
Plaintiffs Norman and Helen Barber paid First Federal for in
their purchase of the beneficial rights on or about November 3,
1983.
5.

That he knows Norman and Helen Barber bid $33,191.94 at

the trust deed sale on this property on November 4, 1983.

fit*J

£/-to-$?

$•
That he is familiar with the representations from
Plaintiffs made by letter dated August 29, 1983 where Barbers
alleged that the property was worth between $45,000 and $60,000,
and knows that, for the date of the sale, such values were
conservative.
7.
On November 2nd and 3rd, 1983 he was involved in
several conversations initiated by George Daines, attorney for
Plaintiffs who asked him to agree to let the Barbers take over
this property aforementioned by paying First Federal, and
applying between $12,000 and $15,000 against the prior judgment
to his credit, plus giving Von Stocking an additional $3,000.
8.
That Mr. Daines continued these conversations while
the undersigned was trying to cure the default with First Federal
and until the morning of the trust deed sale on November 4, 1983.
9.
That there was no doubt that the Barbers wanted to take
over this property in order to collect from me on the judgment
they had against the Emporium, the undersigned, Don and Ray.
10. That he relied on the representations by Mr. Daines on
behalf of Plaintiffs that he would credit the prior judgment, and
believed he had kept his word, which the undersigned has very
good notes on, because Plaintiffs took no further action to
collect from the undersigned until the prior judgment almost
expired.
11. That Mr. Daines represented that he wanted each of the
individual Defendants in the prior judgment to pay only the
percentage of the prior judgment equal to their percentage of the
Emporium Partnership.
12. That if Mr. Daines did not intend to go through with
what he promised on behalf of his clients, the Plaintiffs should
be required to honor his promises since Plaintiffs in fact
proceeded to take over the property, and the undersigned relied
on these representations by their attorney.
In fact, Mr. Daines
was fraudulent in his representations, but this fraud, of not
crediting the prior Barber judgment, did not become apparent
until
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February 7, 1987 when Mr. Daines again served Mr. Stocking's wife
with a Motion and Order for Mr. Stocking to appear in Supplemental proceedings on the prior judgment.
DATED this J3
day of April, 1987.

,^071/fc
lckxx K.
K. Stocking
Stockincr
Von

'

Von K. Stocking having been duly sworn on oath deposes and
states that he is the affiant and that he has read the foregoing
Affidavit, knows the contents thereof and believes the same to be
true and as to items stated on information and belief, the same
are believed to be true.

^^/^>^^W
Von K. Stocking
'
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this /«3c

day of April,

1987.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Commission Expires:

Residing at:

y'Jt'J'pY

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^0
day of April, 1987, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Von Stocking was
mailed postage prepaid to the following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
108 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

Secretary
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